The fable of cinema: the interplay between the representational and the aesthetic regime

Myrthe van der Staay (526414)
Erasmus University College
Aesthetics & Politics
20-12-2020









In 2019, Martin Scorcese, warned Hollywood about the degradation of real cinema. In his opinion, the immensely popular blockbuster Marvel movies endanger real cinema. For Scorcese, cinema is about revelation, mystery and risk. Franchise movies as put out by Marvel do not contain risk but rather are “perfect products manufactured for immediate consumption” (Scorcese, 2019, p.27). The enormous success of Marvel-like movies have installed a norm for what is appropriate and what is not to be on the screen, reducing screen time for low-budget independent films (Scorcese, p.27). Simultaneously, the European cinema climate has been seeing a resurgence of performative realism over the last two decades characterized by directors such as Bela Tarr, Lars von Trier and Yorgos Lanthimos (Koutsourakis, 2012, p.84).
In order to philosophically make sense of how these concurrently recent developments can coexist in cinema, I will use some of Rancière’s key concepts to illustrate the ongoing conflict between the representational and aesthetic regime in cinema. I will begin by defining the different art regimes and the concept of the distribution of the sensible. After, I will relate his concept to cinema and discuss the fable of cinema. Finally, I will discuss which loopholes in cinema are left to keep cinema from dying and how this can be seen in the current European wave of makers such as Bela Tarr, Lars von Trier and Yorgos Lanthimos.

Rancierè’s art regimes
Rancière differentiates between three regimes of art: the ethical, the representational and the aesthetic regime. A regime of art reflects the relationships and criteria that decide what is understood under art and what is not (David, 2010, p.134). One work of art can be viewed in three different ways, and dependent upon the regime, is valued in respective manners. In the first regime, works of art do not have any autonomy, they are not an end in themselves, but rather function as means to install ethos in society. This regime of art is most evident in Plato’s writings where “art” is solely judged for its ethos and has no intrinsic quality of its own (Ranciere & Concoran, p.15). In the second regime, art loses its purely utilitarian function and becomes an end in itself through the value judgement of mimesis. Not mimesis to resemble an original or a higher truth but mimesis for the art of mimesis. The representational regime is intrinsically hierarchic as the norms by which the mimesis is judged is based on conventions about what is appropriate and what is not (Davis, 2010, p.135) In the third regime, the aesthetic one, these hierarchies are lost. Through relaxing the assumption that art should be ethical or representational, any object or activity has the potential to be art (Davis, p.136). Art in the aesthetic regime becomes transcendental, it does not bear a presupposed purpose nor does it imitate, but it instead transcends the ordinary sensory experience. From this, Rancière incurs that all art in the aesthetic regime bears a particular political meaning. Whereas “form” or “matter” has exclusive properties, the sensuous aesthetic experience is universal (Davis, p.137).
In reaching this conclusion Rancière builds on Kant and Schiller by borrowing Kant’s notion of the universality of aesthetic experience. Kant argues that everyone has the cognitive abilities for imagination and understanding or “free play” independent of social status, age, gender and so on. Free play suggests an equality amongst all men (Davis, p.132). Rancière carefully notes that this does not imply however that aesthetic experience works as a direct tool for equality, rather it holds a promise, a possibility, of equality (Davis, p.133). Important to note is that not all art necessarily provides an aesthetic experience, and thus necessarily contains a revolutionary potential. Rancière stresses that only the aesthetic regime is based upon equality and bears the political potential to “redistribute the sensible” (Panagia, 2010, p.100).


The (re)distribution of the sensible
Rancière’s distribution of the sensible is a play on the double meaning of the french word “partager” that, depending on the context, can either mean sharing or dividing. Rancière uses this double meaning to illustrate that the distribution of the sensible alludes to the condition of sharing that is at the basis of a collectivity, whilst simultaneously offers the condition for the disruption of that same order (Panagia, 2010, p.95). The distribution of the sensible can be seen as a fine line that decides who is visible, audible and entitled to speak in the political context. Politics then, is at play, when the distribution of the sensible is altered. People who were invisible, or voiceless, suddenly become visible and create dissensus, disrupting the previous consensus. Dissensus lays bare the existence of such a distribution and the inherent inequality in the distribution of the sensible (Panagia, p.96). A redistribution of the sensible disrupts the general consensus on what is appropriate and what is not, and legitimizes new voices that were previously considered as inaudible gibberish. Politics is a singularity, only at play whenever consensus is disrupted and a new division of the sensible is in the making. Following the literal reorienting of perceptual space, politics has an inherently aesthetic dimension (Rancière & Concoroan, 2010, p.2). Art in the aesthetic regime on its turn, is always a play on reality and holds a promise for a different reality. The innovative quality in art gives it an inescapable political dimension. Politics and art share an innovative quality that has the potential to disrupt the contemporary consensus from the basis of equality (Rancière & Concoran, p.15). A distribution of the sensible naturally contains an inequality between those who are included and those who are not. A redistribution allows for inclusion (or exclusion for that matter) by yet unidentified actors.
An example of this in the context of cinema can be found in the cultural revolution in cinema ignited by the French new wave in the 1960s. Unique about the French new wave is that its initiators were not filmmakers but cinephiles and film critics. At the time (western) cinema was something almost uniquely ascribed to Hollywood and its playfully dubbed “factory of dreams” (De Buysere, 2013, §1). Progress in cinema equalled a progress in cinematic technique of creating a phantasy world. The French cinephiles were intrigued by filmmaking but did not have the means to make films by the standards of Hollywood. Cinema, as it was understood back then, was only available to a handful of privileged makers. During the political upheaval in the 1960s, these cinephiles took the risk and started making movies on their own, regardless of Hollywood’s norms. Simply put, the films of Truffaut, followed by makers such as Jean-Luc Godard and Agnès Varda, showed that making good and intriguing movies could be a lot more simple (De Buysere, §1). Their rebellion was initially met by resistance of France’s established film industry, with the suspension of Truffaut at Cannes after writing a critical article as one of the most famous examples. Only one year later Truffaut was warmly accepted back into the film community by receiving Cannes’ prize for best Director for his film 400 blows (Monaco, 2004, p.13). Rancière’s concept of a redistribution of the sensible lends itself well in this context. Cinephilia, which were previously excluded from the possibility of feature film making, through dissensus, completely turned around the consensus of filmmaking and changed it for subsequent generations.
The redistribution of the sensible as illustrated by the forerunners of the French new wave, has been made possible by the aesthetic regime. The arrival of the aesthetic regime does not imply though that the ethical and the representational regimes have disappeared. Multiple regimes can coexist at the same time and be present in the same artwork (Davis, 2010, p.138). It is here where cinema proves to be a peculiar form of art. Cinema exhibits the conflicting forces of the representational and aesthetic regime simultaneously in one medium (Davis, p.128). To understand this, we need to further understand cinema.

The fable of cinema
The arrival of the camera held the promise to represent the world how it truly is, to show an objective view. Jean Epstein, a 1930s director, once bluntly stated: ‘Cinema is truth. A story is a lie.’ (Rancière, 2014, p.9). Epstein saw cinema as writing with light, a pure scripture of movement, adding nothing more and leaving out nothing less. Cinema was to break with representational art and leave behind the traditional functions of narrative art. Soon though, cinema became an explicit embodiment of representational art through propaganda films such as Leni Riefenstahl’s Olympia (1936) (Rancière, p.10 ). Regardless if a film is propaganda or not, any film is a unique composition of sound, music and visuals materials that together make a sequence, that in turn creates a certain story or “fable” (Davis, 2010, p.147). The promise of cinema to emancipate from literature did not come true, leading some critics to regard cinema as a perverse extension of literature and thus the representational regime. For Adorno, for instance, film does not have the potential to have political effect (Davis, p.152). Adorno recalls that the origins of cinema lie in its technological quality for mass reproduction and redistribution (Hansen, 1981, p.187). This purpose of cinema consequently creates movies that can be appreciated by the masses, resulting in simple, representational movies that serve the consensus in place. Scorcese’s analysis of Marvel movies reminds us of Adorno’s analysis of the culture industry. In contrast to Scorcese, Adorno has no hope for independent films left and argues that all artistic freedom eventually becomes subsumed by the logic of mechanical reproduction which is inseparable from the practice of filmmaking (Hansen, p.188). In Adorno’s analysis cinema is viewed exclusively from the representational regime of art.
Rancière, however abstains from declaring cinema either completely aesthetic, as Epstein would, or purely representational as Adorno suggests. In the preface of his book The Intervals of Cinema, Rancière investigates the gaps between what we see on the screen and what we make of it in our mind. Before starting his analysis, Rancière stresses that he is not a film critic, theorist or teacher. Rather, he situates himself as an amateur, much like the forerunners of the French new wave he is an outsider in the field and departs from a personal connection to film. This position is a theoretical and political one that allows him to sideline expert opinions and examine cinema from a new perspective. The intervals of Cinema refers to the gaps between what is projected on the screen and how we interpret it, how we retell it, how it makes us feel. These gaps are hard to grasp in mere film theory or Marxist ideological theories (Rancière, 2014, p.4). Every film, in fact, generates two films. One directly on the screen and one made up of the fragments that remain as a residu in our brain (Ranciere, 2014, p.8). The intervals between these two films is a play between the representational and aesthetic regime that given certain political conditions may pave a way to dissensus. In many ways cinema is the domain par excellence for amateurs, as Godard and Scorcese alike have pointed out, cinema is about mystery, about leaving a gap for the audience to reconstruct our own cinematic poem. This participatory role of the spectator is inseparable from the aesthetic regime of art, where looking always also means acting. (De Buysere, 2013, §2).
The potential in contemporary European performative realism
In contrast to Hollywood, the contemporary European alternative cinematic landscape is characterized by a resurgence in mysterious and ambiguous films. This wave represented by filmmakers such as Lars von Trier, Yorgos Lanthimos and Bela Tarr, exhibits a stark contrast with Hollywood movies. The movies are characterized by a minimization of text-bound dramaturgy and the narratives are often fragmented and ambiguous (Koutsourakis, 2012, p. 84). The films require a certain audience participation to fulfill the work. The opposition between the contemporary European wave and the Hollywood tenure may be best illustrated in Deleuzian terms. Deleuze differentiates between two types of cinema: cinema of the body, and cinema of action. The latter relies heavily on narrative causality and entertainment, whereas the former is performative, that is, it cannot be simply understood as a reproduction of a script but favours gestures over narrative causality (Koutsourakis, p. 85). Although Rancière does not make a harsh distinction between two types of cinema as he thinks any film can hold multiple functions simultaneously, in his introduction to The intervals of Cinema he recalls how cinema can transform the most common gestures, such as a hand fumbling with a curtain, into a new unique meaning of its own once shown on a lighted screen (Rancière, 2014, p.3).
To illustrate further what cinema of the body entails, Koutsourakis analyzes Von Trier’s Dogville (2003). Dogville is an excellent example of the interplay between camera and subject for various reasons. One, during the shoot actors were often unaware whether the camera was rolling or not, blurring the lines between the private and fictional character. Second, there was a lot of free interpretation in the script which allows the performers to transcend the initial intention of the script and rewrite it as they go along. The film becomes more theatrical and the script becomes a departure point to a yet unknown final product than a final product in itself (Koutsourakis, 2012, pp.88-89). The film’s ambiguity has resulted in various critical and political readings of the film.
For example, for Judith Butler the film opens up the discussion of the social construct of gender. Butler argues that the performative character of the film is both dramatic and non-referential. It is non-referential because an act does not come from a fixed identity, such as gender, but rather comes forward through performative acts allowing gender to be the subject of transformation (over the course of the film the good-hearted female protagonist transforms into a mass-murderer). Gender is only real insofar as it is performed. For Butler, the visibility of this process of performativity is of political importance as it may uncover processes of social construction which are usually invisible (Koutsourakis, p. 95). Trier’s performative realism uncover micropolitics of everyday life that have disappeared in contemporary Hollywood’s focus on technology as a reproductive tool. The alternative European cinema scene, characterized by directors such as Von Trier, form a small but significant block against Hollywood non-critical films. Performative realism asks the audience to rethink contemporary forms of human interaction and its origins. In the last phrases of his article Koutsourakis suggests that the rise in this new aesthetic might be closely related to the contemporary political climate. It can not be entirely coincidental that in the countries most affected by the 2008 economic crisis, such as Greece, Hungary and Romania “cinema of the body” is on the rise (Koutsourakis, pp. 106-107). This final suggestion gives Koutsourakis’ analysis of the politics of performativity an arguably Rancièrian element. It is only when the arts and politics meet that dissensus sparks and creates something new.

Conclusion
Essentially, Scorcese’s analysis of Hollywood is a modern analysis of the mechanisms of the culture industry, as previously coined by Adorno and Horkheimer. Following Adorno we can grimly conclude that the end of cinema is in fact already here and that what’s left of “independent” films is bound to eventually be commodified by the culture industry before it has the chance to really unfold (Adorno & Levin, 1966, p.204). Adorno disregards any revolutionary potential in film on the basis that its origins lie in the capitalist wish for mechanical production. According to Adorno cinema has not been born from the prospect of innovation, and thus also will never be truly innovative (Hansen, 1981, p.187). Rancière, on the other hand, notes that the first articulations of cinema were strictly anti-representational and political. Nonetheless, cinema has become a fable running contrary to itself. The camera has the potential to break the hierarchies of the representational, but the filmmaker is too often lured back into the narrative arts they initially tried to overcome (Conley, 2005, p.97). Fable or not, the play between the representational and the aesthetic regime as present in cinema still means that there is political potential in cinema and thus a possibility for a redistribution of the sensible. The politics of performativity as sketched out by Koutsourakis identifies some unexpected saviours of cinema. The ambiguous, open-ended and non-linear films that characterize this wave can be regarded to be aesthetic in the sense that in the interval between the screen and the interpretation engages an audience that, in turn, molds new meanings possibly resulting in dissensus.

















Bibliography

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